POD: Election Day Extra Quality
LINK ---> https://shoxet.com/2tiID8
I mean, honestly. And Jack, did you listen to that episode Right It was so weird. We were talking about voting and disaster planning. And now here we are sitting in our closets during a global pandemic with the 2020 general election quickly approaching.
Join our volunteer team of 2020 Election Ambassadors to share the importance of registering to vote, being informed on the candidates and propositions and taking action to vote in the November 3 election.
The event is designed to give Hussman students, faculty and staff a forum that helps makes sense of election day results and the process going forward. In such a heated political season and a challenging social atmosphere, the discussion provides an alternative to post-election political fervor.
Panels of faculty experts in law and politics will come together for six non-partisan discussions to address the most pressing legal and political issues that arise in the days and weeks following the election. Topics for each session will be determined by current events. No two sessions will be the same.
Looking for information on state-specific election security efforts or additional FAQs Check out the #TrustedInfo2022 page from the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) and the Election FAQs page from the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED).
Rumor vs. Reality is designed to provide accurate and reliable information related to common MDM narratives and themes that relate broadly to the security of election infrastructure and related processes. It is not intended to address jurisdiction-specific claims. Instead, this resource addresses election security rumors by describing common and generally applicable protective processes, security measures, and legal requirements designed to deter, detect, and protect against significant security threats related to election infrastructure and processes.
Get the Facts: Like all digital systems, ballot scanners can malfunction. Similarly, properly functioning ballot scanners may be unable to scan ballots that are damaged, misprinted, or have ambiguous markings. When a ballot cannot be read by a scanner at a voting site, election officials apply procedures to securely store the ballots until they can be counted at a later time. Because the paper ballot itself is the official record of the votes, there is no impact on the accuracy or integrity of election results.
Get the Facts: Election officials regularly update their voter registration lists based on voter requests and data from varying sources that may indicate that a voter has died, moved, registered elsewhere, changed their name, or become otherwise ineligible. These data sources include motor vehicle licensing agencies, entities that maintain death records, confirmation notices mailed to voters, and interstate data exchanges. This helps election officials identify and merge duplicate records, and remove records for individuals who are no longer eligible.
Federal and state laws protect against the removal of eligible registrants from the voter rolls. These include federal prohibitions, applicable in most states, against removing some registrants in the 90 days prior to a federal election and removing registrants solely due to their failure to vote. Unless an election official has first-hand information that a registrant has moved, processes used for removing records for those who may have moved can take longer than two years due to protections to prevent registrants from being removed incorrectly. Such legal protections and the timing of data sharing can result in a lag time between a person becoming ineligible and the removal of their record. This can lead to some official election mail, including mail-in ballots in some states, being delivered to addresses of those who have moved or may be otherwise ineligible. Election officials often encourage people to notify the election office if they receive election mail for individuals who no longer reside at the address.
State and federal laws prohibit voter impersonation, including voting on behalf of an individual who has died, moved, or otherwise become ineligible yet whose record remains temporarily on the voter rolls. Additional election integrity safeguards, including signature matching and verification of other personal data, protect against people casting ballots on behalf of others.
Election officials further implement varying procedures to verify the identity and eligibility of those who submit mail-in/absentee ballots. Those who submit mail-in/absentee ballots are required to sign the mail-in/absentee ballot envelope. In some states, a notarized signature, the signature of a witness or witnesses, and/or a copy of valid identification is also required. Upon receipt of a mail-in/absentee ballot, election officials verify the signature on the mail-in/absentee ballot envelope and/or that the mail-in/absentee ballot has been otherwise properly submitted prior to retrieving the ballot from its envelope and submitting it for counting. Some states notify the voter if there is a discrepancy or missing signature, affording the voter an opportunity to correct the issue.
State policies vary on how to handle an in-person voter who is listed in the poll book as having been sent a mail-in/absentee ballot. In most states, the voter would be required to cast a provisional ballot that could be later reviewed by election officials. In others, the voter may cast a regular ballot and any corresponding mail-in/absentee ballot returned in the name of that voter would be rejected. In all such cases, instances of potential double voting or voter impersonation could be directed to appropriate authorities for investigation.
Get the Facts: Election officials utilize various safeguards to protect ballots returned by voters via drop boxes from being tampered with, stolen, or destroyed. Drop boxes located outdoors are typically made of heavy and high-grade metal, bolted to the ground, and include security features such as locks, tamper-evident seals, minimally sized ballot insertion slots, and fire and water-damage prevention features. Drop boxes located indoors are typically staffed and protected by existing building security measures. Many election offices monitor their drop boxes via 24-hour video surveillance. Ballots returned via drop box are retrieved by election officials or designated individuals, often in bi-partisan teams, at frequent intervals.
Get the Facts: Outages in online voter registration systems occur for a variety of reasons, including configuration errors, hardware issues, natural disasters, communications infrastructure issues, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. As CISA and FBI warned in a public service announcement, a system outage does not necessarily mean the integrity of voter registration information or any other election system has been impacted. When an outage occurs, election officials work to verify the integrity of voter registration information.
Get the Facts: Hacks of state and local IT systems should not be minimized; however, a compromise of state or local IT systems does not mean those systems are election-related. Even if an election-related system is compromised, a compromise of a system does not necessarily mean the integrity of the vote has been affected. Election officials have multiple safeguards and contingencies in place, including provisional ballots or backup paper poll books that limit the impact from a cyber incident with minimal disruption to voting. Additionally, having an auditable paper record ensures that the vote count can be verified and validated.
Get the Facts: This is false. Committing fraud through photocopied or home-printed ballots would be highly difficult to do successfully. This is because each local election office has security measures in place to detect such malicious activity. While the specific measures vary, in accordance with state and local election laws and practices, such security measures include signature matching, information checks, barcodes, watermarks, and precise paper weights.
Get the Facts: Changing an election using fraudulently submitted FWABs would be highly difficult to do. This is because election offices have security measures in place to detect such activity.
Since only military and overseas voters are eligible to use the FWAB, relatively few of them are submitted each election. In 2016, states reported that only 23,291 total FWABs were submitted nationwide, with all but six states receiving less than 1,000 FWABs statewide. Since use is relatively rare, spikes in FWAB usage would be detected as anomalous.
Although felt-tip pens, like Sharpies, may bleed through ballots, some election officials have stated that ballot tabulation equipment in their jurisdictions can still read these ballots. Many jurisdictions even design their ballots with offset columns to prevent any potential bleed through from impacting the ability to easily scan both sides of ballots.
Get the Facts: The systems and processes used by election officials to tabulate votes and certify official results are protected by various safeguards that help ensure the accuracy of election results. These safeguards include measures that help ensure tabulation systems function as intended, protect against malicious software, and enable the identification and correction of any irregularities.
Every state has voting system safeguards to ensure each ballot cast in the election can be correctly counted. State procedures often include testing and certification of voting systems, required auditable logs, and software checks, such as logic and accuracy tests, to ensure ballots are properly counted before election results are made official. With these security measures, election officials can check to determine that devices are running the certified software and functioning properly. 153554b96e
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